



Methodological individualism -  a belief that in explaining social 
phenomena we should begin from the individual as a unit of analysis -  
was a matter of debate and controversy a long time ago. Contemporary 
economists seem to take the view that either the debate is trivial or that 
methodological individualism is obviously right. This complacency has 
been shaken and interest in this subject has recently been revived by the 
publication of some new books and papers. This essay examines the 
new debate, argues that mainstream economists, knowingly or 
unknowingly, do use concepts •which are irreducibly social and defends 
a particular aspect of individualism. The paper ends by drawing 
attention to a paradoxical observation concerning normative judgments 
and methodological individualism.
A SOCIAL SCIENCE which explains social 
regularities and phenom ena, such as 
reciprocity and inflation, wholly from the 
decisions and behaviourof individual human 
beings is described as adhering to 
methodological individualism (henceforth. 
Ml). Whether this is the right methodology 
for social science or not was once a matter 
of considerable dispute, which engaged the 
minds of leading economists and sociologists. 
Gradually interest in the subject died down, 
individuals continued to do social science 
research without, mercifully, trying to 
explicitly articulate the method that they 
were in fact using. But with this developed 
the feeling, especially among economists, 
that the problem of MI was either trivial or 
resolved in its favour. There is, however, a 
revival of interest in the rights and wrongs 
of MI as evidenced in the works of Bhargava 
(1993) and Arrow (1994). The aim of this 
essay is to evaluate this resurgence of interest, 
by critically examining some of Bhargava’s 
ideas, and to present the reader with an open- 
ended and somewhat paradoxical problem 
concerning methodological individualism 
and normative judgments.
Rajeev Bhargava’s book is meant to be 
a challenge to orthodoxy. Inthisdook, which 
is a revised version of his PhD thesis 
submitted to Oxford University, Bhargava 
argues that Ml is not trivial, there are versions 
of it which are intellectually sophisticated 
and deserve our attention; however, MI can 
be challenged and he goes on to construct 
non-individualist methodologies which 
according to him are at least as satisfactory 
as MI. In brief, the aim of this book is not 
to hammer in the last nail but to resurrect 
the old debate. And this he does with 
remarkable command over the discipline -  
its history, its philosophical roots and its 
moorings in economics and sociology. 
Bhargava is one of the most graceful writers 
of social science and the philosophy of social
science. There are criticisms, important ones, 
to be made and I do so, below; but that does 
not change the fact that this book belongs 
to the highest genre of books written on the 
philosophy of social science. There are many 
places where one is left feeling that his 
arguments are not precise enough, that 
deductive reasoning is used well but without 
that final finesse which clinches a theorem 
or destroys some conventional wisdom. At 
the same time what is remarkable and so rare 
in contemporary writing is Bhargava’s flair 
for expressing the philosopher’s anguish 
and elation. A variety of philosophers and 
scientists have suffered the anxiety of self­
doubt, of not knowing whether what they 
are grappling with or have actually 
established is something profound or trivial. 
One has no difficulty in seeing that Bhargava 
means every word when he writes (p 5): “On 
reading the literature one is swung between 
exuberance and despair, from feeling that all 
problems have been resolved to one that 
none has... Gradually an intense frustration 
overwhelms the reader; perhaps there was 
nothing worth discussing in the first place. 
What on earth was all the fuss about?” 
Rajeev Bhargava's agenda is a very clear 
one. He first surveys the myriad schools of 
methodological individualism, isolates what 
he considers its strongest version and then 
attempts to construct a non-individualist 
methodology which challenges it. His 
sympathies are clearly anti-MI, even more 
between the lines than in them. He 
nevertheless does a very good job of 
presenting the various historical arguments 
for  Ml. In fact, the only criticism one can 
make of this initial part of the book is its 
taxonomic indulgence. Thus one soon 
encounters ontological individualism , 
semantic individualism and explanatory 
individualism. The latter is, in turn, split 
betw een its ‘nom ological and non- 
nomological’ (I must confess to an occasional
feeling that ‘she sells sea-shells’ is easier) 
variants. And there are more subdivisions 
and categories.
What Bhargava settles for as the best face 
of MI is what in this book is christened 
‘iritentionalism’. The intentional man is 
somewhere between the well known but 
‘yeti’-like homo economicus and equally 
rare homo sociologies. He can choose and 
decide individually but he is not a relentless, 
maximising agent. He has psychology and 
a sense of social norms, which distinguishes 
him from the com puter-like homo 
economicus. I do not know about sociology, 
but his view of economic man does over­
simplify the characterisation of human beings 
that occurs in the modern economics 
literature. 1 shall return to this later!
Then, after going through some discussions 
of the limitations of MI, the author develops 
the idea of ‘contextualism’ as a challenge 
to MI, including intentionalism . The 
challenge consists of arguing that a variety 
of beliefs and practices in everyday life 
make sense only in the context of the society 
where they occur. Hence, in describing 
society or an economy we are compelled to 
use concepts which are irreducibly social.
The problem with this thesis is not that 
it is unacceptable but that it is too acceptable, 
and it is not clear that the critique of social 
science on which it is based is a fair critique. 
To be on safer ground while making this 
argument, I shall confine my attention mostly 
to economics. Indeed Rajeev Bhargava pegs 
a lot of his analysis on the writings of 
economists like Hayek and Schumpeter. 
Joseph Schumpeter is the person who coined 
the term ‘methodological individualism' and 
is at times treated (not by Bhargava) as the 
original defender of this method. This is 
wrong because there were others using the 
method and espousing its cause even before 
the term had been coined. The Austrian 
economist, Carl Menger, for instance, 
published a book in 1883, where he makes 
a vigorous case forthis method. This in itself 
is enough to deprive Schumpeter (despite 
his famous precocity) of any claims to 
paternity for this idea, 1883 being the year 
of Schumpeter’s birth.
As an aside, Hayek’s position is not very 
representative of modern economic thinking 
since he seems to have concluded, in violation 
of a well known dictum of David Hume, that 
the normative case for individualism and 
non-in tervention  can be based on 
methodological individualism.
The reason why Bhargava’s case that 
certain beliefs and concepts are inextricably 
social is unlikely to stir a hornet’s nest is 
that though many economists claim to be 
rigid adherents of Ml, they do use and have 
always used social concepts and categories. 
This has been very convincingly argued 
recently by Kenneth Arrow in his Ely lecture 
[Arrow 1994], Arrow points out how a 
variable such as priye in a competitive model
is an irreducibly social concept. Each 
individual takes price to be given but the 
price that comes to prevail is an outcome 
of the choices of the collectivity. So 
economists constructing equilibrium models, 
who claim to be hardened methodological 
individualists, are actually not so. They 
unwittingly follow a method which uses 
social categories and, therefore, is not too 
far away from w hat B hargava is 
recom m ending, thereby m aking the 
recommendation partly futile. Hence, despite 
the excellence of his style and plenty of 
thought-provoking passages and sections, 
his ultimate position reinforces some o f his 
early fears -  it is not clear that it actually 
makes a difference for the practitioner.
To me it seems that the more contentious 
and substantial methodological debate 
concerns the permissibility of a certain class 
of propositions in social science. Bhargava 
discusses this in the context of the works 
of Elster and Roemer but does not give 
centrality to it. Consider the following 
proposition:
‘The landlord will undertake action A, 
because it is in the landlord’s class interest 
to do so.” (Action A could, for instance, be: 
“refuse to hire a servant who has fled another 
landlord’s employment and offers to work 
for this landlord for a very low wage”.)
I shall call this proposition P. There are 
many social scientists who believe that P is 
not permissible. I have sympathy with this. 
People do occasionally behave in certain 
ways simply because those are in theirgroup 
or class interest. But as an axiom to be 
generally applied, I find P unacceptable. If 
I am to use an axiom like proposition P, I 
would usually want to first satisfy myself 
as to why it may be in the landlord’s self- 
interest to behave in a way which is in his 
class interest. Or, at the very least, I would 
go along with P only insofar as there is no 
direct evidence or reason to believe that in 
this case the landlord’s class interest does 
actually conflict with his self-interest. Hence, 
in explaining behaviour, I consider the 
reduction to individual interest to be of some 
importance. However, this does not negate 
the use of beliefs, concepts and variables 
which are irreducibly social. It is not clear 
that a researcher who does both (that is, 
resists explaining individual behaviour solely 
in terms of its ability to serve group or class 
interests but uses concepts and beliefs which 
are inherently social) is an MI person or an 
anti-MI person and neither is this a very 
important question. The important and 
contestable question seems to me to be 
whether assumptions like proposition P 
should or should not be used. And, as I just 
explained, I would prefer to avoid such 
assumptions as far as possible.
In closing, I want to discuss one more 
contentious matter. This concerns how even 
in our normative statements we make use 
o f elem ents o f non-individualism , 
unwittingly. To those who insist on Ml, and 
perhaps even to others, the problem that is 
outlined below constitutes almost a paradox 
and certainly a challenge. I present it here
without offering any ‘solution’, as an open- 
ended problem for the reader.
It seems arguable that we often pass moral 
judgments on groups of people which cannot 
be reduced to the individuals in the group. 
Observations of the following kind are clearly 
not uncommon.
1 “It is a shame that no one in JNU does 
research on poverty”, or
2 “It speaks very poorly of the economics 
profession that so few economists in the 
nineteen thirties were writing on the 
unemployment problem despite that bei ng 
one of the most important problems of 
that time.”
I should clarify that I did not choose I 
and 2 for their empirical validity - 1 would 
not dare -  but purely for illustrating certain 
kinds of normative judgments, though 2, I 
know, is true.
Let us here concentrate on 1. If a person 
making this observation were asked: “Do 
you therefore feel that it is wrong that 
Professor X in JNU does not do research on 
poverty?”, the answer would typically be: 
“O f course not. I am not blaming any 
individual for not working on poverty”. So 
presumably when we make an observation 
such as 1, we are not casting moral aspersion 
on any individual in JNU, though we are 
clearly casting aspersion on JNU as a whole. 
Hence, by analysingour ‘language of morals’ 
we find that we do use non-individualistic 
judgm ents, since we do often make 
observations like 1.
There is one possible chink in the above 
argument. Some may want to say that I does 
amount to a small moral criticism of each 
person in JNU. I shall, however, argue that 
this is not a valid line. Assume it is valid. 
Now, if a few persons in JNU began working 
on poverty, then clearly criticism 1 would 
cease to be true. Hence, the others in JNU 
would be exonerated of the small moral 
criticism without having changed their 
behaviour at all. This does not seem an 
acceptable method of moral evaluation. 
Hence the claim that everybody in JNU is 
morally guilty is wrong. Therefore we may 
conclude that 1, which belongs to a common 
class of moral judgments, shows that moral 
judgments are not always reducible to 
individualism. My inclination is not to pass 
moral judgments on groups unless we can 
reduce it to all its members or, at the very 
least, to some of them.
A similar dilemma but with a possible 
solution has been suggested by Dworkin. He 
argues that in situations of shared or group 
responsibility it may be reasonable to 
personify the group or the community. Thus, 
when a corporation produces a dangerously 
defective good but it is not possible to pin 
down the responsibility on any particular 
individual in the corporation, we may need 
to treat the corporation as a moral agent 
and apply “facsimiles of our principles 
about individual fault and responsibility to 
it” (Dworkin 1986:170]. And then, by 
virtue of the corporation's responsibility, 
we may proceed to hold the agents and 
members of the corporation responsible. This
is methodologically interesting. Individuals 
are still essential units in his analysis but, 
unlike in standard  m ethodological 
individualism, judgment on the group 
precedes the individual.
He demonstrates with a very elegant 
example how we, unwittingly, do often use 
this method. This happens, for instance, 
when we talk of the state’s or the community ’ s 
responsibility for certain kinds of individual 
rights. Thus we talk of the state’s obligation 
to ensure that no one is assaulted by others. 
Moreover, we do this even before agreeing 
on how this responsibility is to be apportioned 
across various units of the state, for instance, 
thepolice, the bureaucracy and the military. 
Dworkin (p 171) points out how we discuss 
the community’s responsibility and “leave 
for separate consideration the different issues 
of which arrangement of official duties would 
best acquit the communal responsibility” 
(my italics).
1 find this bifurcation o f discourse 
troublesom e. To talk  o f a g roup ’s 
responsibility without knowing how it is to 
be apportioned out to the individuals in the 
group, seems to me to be useful only to the 
extent that such an apportionment is 
eventually possible. If it were not possible, 
then we should turn back and question 
whether it was reasonable, in the first place, 
to think of the group as having that 
responsibility, lnother words, the bifurcation 
of discourse is merely a matterof convenience 
and there may well be situations where the 
outcome in the second part requires-us to 
revaluate our conclusions of the first part. 
This, in turn, means that the personification 
of the corporation or the community can 
only be an interim construct, which may 
need to be dismantled if we are eventually 
unable to spread the responsibility in some 
reasonable way across the members of the 
corporation or the community.
Returning to my example, this means that 
we cannot first decide that the personification 
of JNU is responsible for a certain neglect 
and then, by virtue of that, hold every JNU 
professor culpable. So the dilem m a 
mentioned above continues to persist: We 
have to either admit that methodological 
individualism does not extend to normative 
judgments (which in Dworkin’s example 
would mean that we may personify the group 
but have to stop there and not carry the 
judgment over to the individuals) or take the 
position that, though we do in practice pass 
judgments on groups, these arc, in fact, 
meaningless and best resisted.
[I have benefited greatly from some comments 
I received from Kenneth Arrow in response to 
an early version of my argument.]
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